(EBRICKE & CO. vs. THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the Circuit Court of the United States, Western District of
Pennsylvania.
(EBRICKE AND COMPANY VS. THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH.

1. A municipal corporation has not, in general, power to make ordinances for the
construction of canals, turnpikes, or railroads, beyond the territorial limits of its
jurisdiction; nor to borrow money and pledge or encumber the individual property of its citizens for that purpose.
2. Where special legislative authority is asserted for such purposes, it must be
shown to have been conferred in express terms, and is not to be assumed from
inference or construction.
3. The Pennsylvania Act of April 4, 1837, to incorporate "The Pittsburgh, Kittaning and Warren Railroad," which provides that "any incorporated company,
city, or borough, shall have authority to subscribe" to the stock of that company
"as fully as any individual," only authorizes a municipal corporation to subscribe
to the stock, not to issue bonds or to tax the property of the corporators to pay
the subscription on the bonds or their interest; and the Act of 14th April, 1852,
does not extend the powers of such corporation in this respect. The bonds issued
by the city of Pittsburgh, under these acts, ruled to be void.
4. Under the Act of 21st April, 1852, to incorporate the Pittsburgh and Steubenville
Railroad, which authorizes the city of Pittsburgh to subscribe to the stock
of that company, and to borrow money to pay therefor, but provides "that no
certificate of loan or bond shall be for a less sum than $100, and shall be transferable only on the books of the corporation." The city issued coupon bonds,
with a blank power of attorney to transfer on the books of the city, endorsed.
Ruled, that the holder of coupons of these bonds in suing thereon, must show himself to be an assignee of the bonds on the books of the city, as the mere possession
of a coupon gives no right of action unless where the bonds are properly payable to bearer.
5. But the coupon bonds issued by the city of Pittsburgh under the Act of May 8,
1854, supplementary to the charter of the Pittsburgh and Steubenville Railroad,
ruled to be valid, and that suit might be brought by the holder of the coupons
thereof.
6. The Act of 7th February, 1853, incorporating the Chartiers Valley Railroad,
which authorizes subscription by the city of Pittsburgh to the stock of 'that company, provides that the certificates of loan or bonds issued for that purpose,
"shall be transferable as shall be directed by the said corporation." The city
issued coupon bonds. In an action on certain coupons detached from these
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bonds, ruled that though no ordinance of the city was shown to authorize the
issue of the bonds in that form, it was to be presumed that it was so directed by
the city.

This was an action on certain interest coupons originally attached
to bonds issued by the city of Pittsburgh, under several acts of
Assembly of the State of Pennsylvania. On the trial of the case,
the recovery by the plaintiffs was-resisted on the ground of the illegality of the original bonds.
The charge of the Court was delivered by
GRiER, J.-The plaintiffs are a mercantile firm in Hamburg,
and have instituted this suit against "The Mayor, Aldermen
and citizens of Pittsburgh," a municipal corporation, chartered by
Act of A'ssembly of 18th of March, 1816. The claim set forth in
the declaration is for five hundred and seventy-six coupons, for
interest due on certain bonds issued by the corporation, under their
seal, and signed by the Mayor, and attested by the Treasurer.
These coupons are severed from the bonds, as their name shows
was intended. Each is for six months interest on a bond of $1,000,
viz: thirty dollars. The execution of them has been proved by the
officer who signed them, and is not denied. The bonds to which
they were originally attached, were given to three several railroad
corporations, in payment for subscription of stock. The coupons
differ, (not materially, perhaps,) in their form, and will be noticed
hereafter. The declaration claims to recover five hundred and sixtysix coupons of thirty dollars each. The prosecution have given in
evidence but five hundred and thirty-nine. Of these, four hundred
and three are cut from bonds issued to the Allegheny Valley Railroad, one hundred and two from bonds given to the Pittsburgh
and Steubenville Railroad; and thirty-four to the Chartiers Valley
Railroad.
Had the corporate authorities of the city of Pittsburgh power to
bind the people or corporators by the bonds or securities in question ? On the solution of this question your verdict will depend ;
for I find no dispute about the material facts in evidence. As there
are three several and distinct sets of bonds issued to three several
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corporations under different Acts of Assembly and ordinances of the
corporation, it will be necessary to notice them separately. For
it may be possible that the officers may have acted without authority
in one or more, and not in all.
I. The first in order are the bonds given to the Allegheny Valley
Railroad. In support of this authority we have been referred to
the following Acts of Assembly. The first act affecting the subject
was passed on the 4th day of April, 1837, entitled an act "for the
incorporation of the Pittsburgh, Kittanning and Warren Railroad."
Although thus named, none of the places are made necessary points
in the road or termini thereof: for the company is authorized to
make a road from the " Allegheny river, at the borough of Franklin,
to the Ohio river, at or near the borough of Beaver."
This, however, is immaterial. The first section authorizes certain
Commissioners to open their books and receive subscriptions to the
capital stock; and when two thousand shares are subscribed, and
five dollars paid on each share, they are to certify this fact to the
Governor, who is authorized thereupon to issue letters patent, constituting the subscribers a body corporate, &c. By the second section
of this act, it is enacted that "' any incorporated company, city or
borough shall have authority to subscribe thereto as fully as any
individual." The seventeenth section requires the road to be commenced within five years and finished within ten years; otherwise
the charter shall be void. No charter ever issued, nor was any corporation constituted under this act within the ten years.
2. But on the 16th of March, 1847, an act was passed, called a
supplement to the first, extending the time for commencing the construction of the road till the 1st day of June, 1852, and of completion till the 1st of June, 1862. 8. A second supplement thereto
was passed. April 15th, 1851, giving the said company (although no
company was yet incorporated,) authority to construct a road from
Pittsburgh to-Kittanning, and thence to the New York State line,
and repealing so much of the first act as made Beaver and Franklin
termini or points therein. 4. On the 10th of January, 1852, a
charter of incorporation was issued by the Governor "to the Pittsburgh, Kittanning and Warren Railroad Company."
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5. On the 14th of April, 1852, a further supplement was passed,
changing the name of the corporation to the "Allegheny Valley
Railroad Company," and making some other changes. Section
four enacts that it shall be lawful for the counties and cities subscribing to the stock, "1to pay the amount of their subscriptions, if
agreed upon by the parties, by the transfer of stocks held by them
in other incorporated companies." Section six enacts "1that the
several acts of the General Assembly, limiting the amount of corporate debts of the cities of Pittsburgh and Allegheny, shall not
prevent either of said cities from subscribingto the stock of said
company."
Have we here any authority to the defendants to issue these bonds
and the coupons annexed? This is a question of great magnitude
and importance; and my sense of responsibility is somewhat relieved
by the knowledge that any opinion I may have hastily formed may
be hereafter reviewed by another tribunal. And as I have neither
leisure or opportunity, in the haste of a trial at bar, to defend by
argument the conclusions to which I have arrived, I can but state
them briefly, without attempting to vindicate their correctness.
The municipal corporation of the city of Pittsburgh, though it
acts through a special legislature elected by the citizens, is entrusted
with special, not general powers. It may pass ordinances in regard
to its internal affairs, to preserve the peace and the health of the
citizens, to regulate the streets of the city, and, in fine, all other
matters connected with it which come under the denomination of
internal police for the better government of the city. It may borrow money for the special purposes of the trust and authority confided to them, and lay taxes to raise money for these purposes.
But it has no power, by virtue of its act of incorporation, to exercise
any discretion in making ordinances for the construction of canals.
turnpikes or railroads, beyond the territorial limits of its jurisdiction.
It cannot compel the citizens to become partners or stockholders in
private corporations, or pledge or encumber the individual property
of the citizens in speculative undertakings. Its powers are only
co-extensive with its duties. Hence the necessity of a special license
from the legislature to a municipal corporation to subscribe for
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stock in such corporations. Whether the legislature of the State
may confer upon the officers of such municipal corporations the
power to bind the people of a city or county by bonds, and to burden them with taxes to raise money for external objects even of
general interest, or to compel them to become partners in any and
every incorporated association, is a question on which much difference of opinion exists.
In this State, however, this question has been decided by your
own Supreme Court, the only authoritative expounders of your
Constitution and Statutes. To their decision it is our duty to submit, without questioning its propriety. Assuming then, that the
legislature has the constitutional power to authorize the officers of a
municipal corporation to bind the corporators by instruments such
as those now declared on, with or without their individual consent,
have they conferred it in clear and distinct terms ? It is too important and dangerous a power to be assumed from inference or construction.
"A statute may invest a corporation with powers contrary to the
general rules of law, but they must be granted in clear and unambiguous terms; they will not be implied or presumed, and they must
be exercised according to the strict interpretation of the grant."
Wilcox on Corp., 26, Kirk vs. JVNorvill, 1 D. and E. 124. "The
jurisdiction of a municipal corporation is local ; its duties and its
powers ate local; and any power to act on subjects without,
must be conferred by the legislature in language which cannot be
mistaken."
The second section of the act of April, 1837, which is supposed
to authorize the execution of the bonds in question, authorizes "any
incorporated company, city or borough" to subscribe to the stock of
the railroad "1as fully as any individual." It is a bare authority
to subscribe for stock, or to become a stockholder in another corporation, as any individual might do. If the subscriber has money
to invest in stocks, he may invest it in this railroad stock. The law
gives the municipal officers permission, and nothing more. It confers no authority to issue bonds with or without coupons, or to tax
the property of the corporators to pay for the stock or lift the bonds,
or pay the interest on them.
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The fourth section of the act of 14th of April, 1852, authorizes
them to pay the amount of their subscriptions by transfer of other
stocks held by them in other corporate companies; and the sixth
section of the same act provides that the acts limiting the amount
of corporate debts shall "not prevent either of said citiesfrom subscribing" to the stock of the railroad. Here they are authorized to
pay in stocks owned in other corporations, but not to contract debts
or give bonds. And the releases of a former disability cannot be
construed to confer a power not before granted.
To support the plaintiff's case on this point, we must decide that
the officers of the corporation have an unlimited power to subscribe
the whole stock to build the road, say five to ten millions of dollars;
and not only so, but to issue bonds binding the corporators to pay
principal and interest, and to lay taxes on their property for that
purpose. In other words, to mortgage the whole income of the
people of Pittsburgh. The court must instruct you that such an
enormous and irresponsible power as is here claimed, is not to be
found either in direct terms or by any legitimate inference in the
Acts of Assembly. The power is to the full extent I have stated,
or it does not exist at all. You are therefore instructed, that the
officers of the corporation defendant had no authority whatever to
issue the bonds and coupons declared upon and now produced.
This disposes of the case so far as regards the four hundred and
three coupons on the bonds issued to the Allegheny Valley Railroad.
II. Let us now examine the authority to issue the bonds to the
Pittsburgh and Steubenville Railroad Company. These are issued
under two several Acts of Assembly, which we will examine
separately. The first issue is by virtue of the authority conferred by
the third section of the act of 21st April, 1852, P. L. 418, which is as
follows.1 (Court here read from the act as set forth in Pamphlet Laws.)
I This section, so far as is material, is in these words:

"That the city and

boroughs hereinafter named be and they are hereby authorized to subscribe to the
capital stock of the said company the number of shares hereinafter mentioned,
namely: the city of Pittsburgh 5000 shares * * * * the same to be subscribed by the proper authorities, or a majority of them, of the said cities and
boroughs respectively ; and they are hereby respectively authorized to borrow
money to pay therefor, and to make provision for the principal and interest of the
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Here we have a direct authority given, not only to subscribe for
five thousand shares of the stock of the railroad company, but also
to borrow money to pay therefor, and make provision for principal
and interest of the money so borrowed. But it is also enacted,
"that no certificate of loan or bond shall be for a less sum than
one hundred dollars, and shall be transferableonly on th~e books of
the city." Are these bonds and coupons within the authority thus
conferred. (Bond read.) The bonds do not set forth how they are
to be transferred, but refer to this act which authorizes their issue.
This suit is on the coupons, and provided for on the bonds. But the
covenant of the bond is to pay to the railroad company and their
assigners. On the back of the bond is endorsed a blank power of
attorney to make an assignment on the books; but no assignment
has been made. The interest is but an incident to the debt, and
unless the plaintiff had the bond assigned to him according to the
act, he has no right to demand the interest. There is no covenant
to pay to the holder or bearer of the bond, and the interest is due
only to the legal holder by assignment, and cannot be made payable
to a third person. The act gives no authority to the city officers
to make such negotiable instruments, having a different mode of
transfer from the bonds to which they were attached.
Where a bond is payable to bearer, the bearer of the coupon shows
a prima facie title to have the interest, because he was owner or
holder of the bond when he cut it off. But where no one can show
a legal title to the bond but an assignee of the bond, there can be
no presumption that he is entitled to the interest by mere possession
of a coupon. The plaintiffs cannot, therefore, recover on the evidence for any of the coupons taken from bonds of the first issue.
2d. As to the second issue. The act is different. (Act of May
8,1854, P. L. 709, read to the jury.) The act does not restrict the
bond to assignees on the books of the city, and provides for and
authorizes the issue of the coupons.
money so borrowed, as in other cases of loans to said city and boroughs respectively;
and no certificate of loan or bond shall be for a less sum than one hundred dollars,
and shall be transferable only on the books of the respective city and boroughs,
kept for that purpose."
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III. Lastly, the Chartiers Valley Road. (Act7th Feb. 1853, § 6,
P. L. 43, which was read.)' Here is full authority to make the bond
and coupons transferable as shall be directed by the city corporation.
There is no city ordinance shown, directing that the bonds shall be
coupon bonds, but the corporation have issued them in that form.
It will be presumed that it was so directed by them. I see no reason why plaintiff should not recover on these coupons on the evidence in the case, if believed by the jury.
The plaintiffs have a right to interest on the coupons which the
jury shall find to have been legally issued under the previous instructions, with interest from day of payment.2

In the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
HENRY STUCKE VS. THE

MILWAUKEE AND MISSISSIPPI RAILROAD
COMPANY.

1. A railroad company is liable for injuries to cattle occasioned by the gross negligence of its servants in the management of its engines, though the cattle were at
the time trespassing on the line of the road, but without direct negligence on the
part of their owner. Dictum in Clark vs. Syracuse, 1'c. R. R Co. 11 Barb. 112,
dissented from.
2. The company, on the other hand, under such circumstance is not bound to the
use of more than ordinary care. And where the owner of the cattle has himself
I By this section, it is in substance provided, that the city of Pittsburgh shall be
authorized to subscribe to the stock of the company five thousand shares, and
"shall have power to borrow money to pay therefor, and to make provision for the
payment of the principal and interest of the money so borrowed, by the assessment
and collection of such tax as may be necessary for that purpose ; and no certificate
of loan or bond shall be issued by the said corporation for a less sum than one hundred dollars, and shall be transferable as shall be directed by the said corporation."
2 The jury retired shortly before eleven, and after a few minutes absence returned
into court with the following verdict: "We find for plaintiff the sum of two
thousand four hundred dollars, with interest to be computed, by agreement of counsel
on the forty-six coupons of the second issue of the Pittsburgh and Steubenville
Railroad Company, and thirty-four coupons of the Chartiers Valley Railroad Company, given in evidence.
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been guilty of negigence, in allowing the beasts to be at large upon or in the
vicinity of the road, or bad suffered them to range in places where it was even
remotely probable that they would stroll on the track; or being present at the
time of the injury, made no effort to remove them, he would not be entitled to
recover except for wilful injuries. DiXoN, Oh. J.
3. A railroad company, in the absence of any statutory provision, is not bound to
fence in its track.
4. In actions where there has been mutual negligence on the part of the plaintiff
and defendant, and the negligence of each party, or of the plaintiff alone, has
been the proximate cause of the injury, the plaintiff cannot recover; otherwise,
where the negligence of the defendant has alone been the proximate cause of the
injury.
5. The English and American cases on these subjects examined at large.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
DIxoN, C. J.-The complaint in this case, which was originally
commenced before a justice of the peace of Crawford county, is in
the usual form of declarations in actions upon the case for negligence,
and alleges substantially that the defendants, by their agents and
servants, withtheir engines and train of cars propelled bysteam, while
running over their railroad track did, on the first day of August,
1857, negligently and carelessly run over and kill a cow of the
plaintiff; and also on the 15th day of May, 1858, an ox; both
alleged to be of the value of one hundred dollars. The defendants
answered, denying each and every allegation of the complaint, and
gave notice that they would prove a former judgment for the same
cause of action, &c. It is admitted that this notice was given through
a mistake of facts, and was not relied upon by the defendants.
Hence no further notice need be taken of it here. Upon the trial
in the circuit court it was proved, that on the first day of August,
1857, the cow in question, with four or five other cattle, was seen
on the railroad track of the defendants, about one-half mile west of
the plaintiff's house, in the town of Prairie du Chien, and that at
the same time the locomotive and train of cars of the defendants
were seen upon the track, about three-fourths of a mile east of the
place where the cow and other cattle were; that the train was going
west, and at much greater speed than usual; that between the places
where the cow and cattle were first seen, the track was straight, or
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nearly so, and that the cattle could be plainly seen the whole distance;
that the locomotive and cars ran against the cow and killed her; that
the speed of the cars was not lessened as they approached the cattle;
that the whistle was not blown, nor was any other signal made or
given to frighten the cattle from the track; and that the occurrence
took place between eight and nine o'clock in the morning.
In regard to the killing of the ox, the plaintiff's witness testified,
that on the 15th of May, at about nine o'clock in the morning, he
saw the defendant's train of cars pass, going west, and a short time
after, he saw it stop; and on going to the spot where it had stopped,
found that the ox mentioned in the complaint had been killed by the
train; that from the place where the ox was killed to the place where
he saw the cars, was about one mile; that the ox was killed in the
plaintiff's meadow; that from the place where the ox was killed,
looking east, a person could see along the railroad track two miles,
the road for that distance being straight, or nearly so; that from
the place where he first saw the cars the ox could be seen, there being
no obstruction to the view when standing on the fracIr; a-id thab
there was no whistling of the locomotive or other signal given until
the train stopped at the place where the ox was killed. It further
appeared by the plaintiff's showing, that that portion of the road upon
which the injuries occurred was located through the plaintiff's lands,
which were used by him as a meadow, and that there was no fence
upon either side. The defendants on their part introduced two
witnesses, neither of whom were present at the time the cattle were
killed. Their testimony, when taken in connection with the rebutting
proofs offered by the plaintiff, did not, in any material point, vary
the facts and circumstances as to the killing as above stated. One
of them, a freight agent on the defendant's road, testified that it
would not in general be safe to attempt to stop a train when in full
motion short of the distance of one-fourth of a mile. The other, a
conductor on the road, testified, that a train of cars going at ordinary
speed, could not safely be stopped short of from sixty to one hundred
rods.
Upon this state of facts the circuit judge, at the request of the
defendants, charged the jury "that the case of Clark vs. Th e
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Sqracuse and Utica Railroad Company, reported in the eleventh
volume of Barbour's Reports, on page 112, is a case nearly like the case
now at bar, in which it was decided, ' that an action for negligence
could not be sustained if the wrongful act of the plaintiff co-operate
with the misconduct of the defendant to produce the damages sustained, and this is so whether the plaintiff's act was negligent or
wilful. It is an act of negligence to suffer cattle to be at large in
the highway at railroad crossings. Therefore, where the owner of
a cow suffers her to be at large in the highway and upon a railroad
track, at the usual time for the passenger train of cars to pass,
and the cow was killed by the train of cars, Held that the owner
could not recover in an action against the railroad company.
Although a person has a right to use the highway for the passage of
his cows to and from the pasture, yet he must use ordinary and
proper care and diligence in driving them; having reference to the
situation of the road, and the manner in which it is used. Where
cows are trespassers upon a railroad, their owners cannot maintain
an action against the railroad company for running over and killing
them by the passenger cars, even if the death of the cows were
occasioned by the gross negligence of the defendants. Accordingly
where it appeared that cows were pasturing in a lot adjoining a
railroad, between which and the railroad there was no fence, and
there was no allegation in the pleadings to authorize evidence that
they escaped on to the road through a defect of fences which the
defendants were bound to repair, and no averments that the defendants were bound to fence at that point, or showing from what place,
or in what manner, or how the cattle came upon the road, R7eld
that no action could be maintained against the railroad company
for running over and killing the cows by 'means of their engines and
cars.'" This charge, which is a verbatim copy of the syllabus of the
case referred to, was, we understand, read from the report by the
judge to the jury, and given to them as the law governing the case,
to which the plaintiff excepted.
The counsel for the plaintiff requested the circuit judge to give
the jury the following instructions, viz :
1. "If you are satisfied from the evidence that the cattle of the
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plaintiff mentioned in the complaint were killed by the willful, careless, or negligent act of the agents or employees of the defendants,
in running their locomotives and cars, or either, on the railroad of
the defendants, in this county, your verdict will be for the plaintiff
to the extent of the value of the property as proved to you."
2. "If you are satisfied from the evidence that the cattle of the
plaintiff mentioned in the complaint were killed on the railway track,
or bed of the defendants, in consequence of the defendant operating
its road with locomotives and cars, or either of them, in this county,
and when the defendants had no fence on either side of such railway
track or bed, your verdict must be for the plaintiff to the extent of
the value of the cattle thus killed as shown by the testimony."
Both these instructions were refused by the court, to which refusal
the plaintiff excepted.
The manner in which the charge in this case was given is certainly
very strange and anomalous. Although such a mode might not be
of itself erroneous, yet when adopted without reference to the facts
in proof before the jury, it will be very likely, as in the present case,
to lead to errors. It does not appear whether the facts in the case
of Clark vs. The Syracuse and Utica Railroad Companyj, were'
stated and explained to the jury or not, or whether or not the jury
were permitted to take the report with them to their consultation
room, there to read and learn them fir themselves.
Certain it is, that if either of these things had been done, the jury
could not have avoided perceiving that there were no points of
resemblance in the two cases, except the single one, that in both
instances cattle were killed by a passing train of cars. The statement of the judge, that that case was nearly like the one at bar, was
certainly calculated to mislead them. In that case it had been the
practice of the plaintiff to suffer his cattle to run at large upon the
track of the railroad. The defendants had remonstrated with him
for so doing, and requested him to keep them off, which he neglected
to do. The train was the regular passenger train, and came along
at the usual hour. He saw the cattle on the track a half or quarter
of an hour before the cars came along; heard the train coming a
mile and a half or more away, and knew that his cattle were there
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at the time of the accident. The engineer saw the cows when he
was fifty or sixty rods off, as he came around a curve. He gave the
signal to brake, reversed his engine, and did all he could to stop,
and so far succeeded that he ran only two or three rods after the
engine struck the cows. It will be seen that cases more dissimilar
could not well be imagined. In that case the plaintiff, against the
expostulations of the defendant had been and then was pursuing a
course of censurable and wanton neglect. He was present at and
before the happening of the accident. He knew the cars were
coming and was well aware of the danger to which his cattle were
exposed, and by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence at the
time might have prevented their destruction. On the part of the
defendants, every effort was made at the earliest possible moment to
prevent a collision. The brakes were put down, and the engine
reversed, but the collision was unavoidable. In the present case, it
does not appear that the plaintiff was in the habit of suffering his
cattle to run upon the defendant's road, that he was present at the
time the accident happened, or knew that his cattle were upon the.
track, or that he was in a situation to take any steps or use any
precautions to avert the injury. There is nothing to show any
moral delinquency on his part. So far as he was concerned, the
presence of his cattle, at the times and places of the injuries, may
have been entirely involuntary or accidental. In view of the
facts established, the most that can be said upon this subject is, that
in law the cattle were trespassers upon the defendants' road, presumed
to have escaped through the insufficiency of the plaintiff's fences,
-which, for the purpose of rendering him responsible for any damage,
done by them while at large, is the same as if he had permitted them
to go without any restraint whatever. Fitzherbert's Abr. N. B. 298.
note; Rust vs. Low, 6 Mass. 99; Jackson vs. -utland and Burlington Railroad Company, 25 Vermont, 161. On the part of the
defendants no measures whatever were resorted to, to avoid killing
the cattle. The whistle of the locomotive was not sounded, no
signal was given; and although according to the testimony of the
defendant's witnesses, in the one instance three, and the other four
times the distance required for stopping the trains with convenience
47
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and safety intervened between the points where the engineer must
have seen the cattle and those where the injuries took place, yet
the speed of the trains was not in the least slackened or checked.
These facts show a most reckless inattention and utter disregard of
consequences on the part of the engineers and those in charge of
the train.
Inasmuch as the judge, in his instructions to the jury, gave them
indiscriminately all the propositions of law laid down in Clark's
case, the discussion of the law in this case can be but little more
than a review of the principles there asserted. The first three
propositions may be regarded as generally correct, but the two
last, when applied to the facts of this case we do not think are so.
That portion of the first proposition in which it is stated that a
plaintiff cannot recover where the damages are the consequence of
his own wilful act is an assertion from the bench, of a truism which
is little short of ridiculous. The maxim of the law is volenti non
fit injuria, and whoever supposed that one party could recover from
another, damages for self inflicted injuries ? After a patient and
thorough study of all the authorities within our reach, we are unable
to find a single case where it has been adjudicated, that "where cattle
are trespassers upon a railroad, their owners cannot maintain an
action against the Railroad Company for running over and killing
them by their passenger cars, even if the death of the cattle were
occasioned by the gross negligence of the defendants." The cases
relied upon to sustain this doctrine are the one above cited, from
which the instruction was taken; Talmadge vs: The Rensselaerand
SaratogaRailroad Company, 13 Barb. 493; Ijfarsh vs. N. Y. and
Erie Railroad Company, 14 id. 365; Terry vs. N. F. Central
Railroad Company, 22 id. 574; and The Tonawanda Railroad
Company vs. Munger, 5 Denio, 255; (S. 0.) affirmed 4 Cornstock, 349.
A particular statement here of the facts of each of these cases
would require too much space, but it will appear at once from an
examination of them that in neither, was the question of the destruction of cattle by the gross negligence of the defendants raised, and
that no opinion upon that question was necessary for their decision.
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It is very evident that in Clark's Case, the facts in which we have
stated, no such question was before the court. The same is true of
the cases in the 13th Barbour, and 5th Denio. In these cases there
was not only no negligence shown on the part of the defendants,
but the proofs were, that for the purpose of avoiding the collisions
they used a degree of diligence equal and even superior to the
exigencies of each occasion. In the cases in the 14th and 22d of
Barbour, there was no proof as to the manner in which the cattle
were killed, and of course no inference that the defendants were
guilty of gross negligence could be drawn. The cases of -illiams
vs. Michigan Central Bailroad Company, 2 Gibbs, Mich. R. 259;
and N. T. and Erie Railroad Oompany vs. Skinner, 19 Penn. St.
298, may also be said to sanction this doctrine. In the former, the
agreed siatement of facts repels any presumption of neglegence on
the part of the company, whilst the latter was decided upon the
ground that there was absolutely no evidence of negligence or
gratuitous damage on the part of the plaintiffs in error. In the
latter case also, the doctrine that the company would be responsible
for wanton or needless damage is expressly recognized. Thus it
appears that the doctrine as yet rests in mere obiter dicta, without a
direct authority in its favor. Trespassers are not outlaws, and before
a doctrine so repulsive to justice and reason, and so contrary to the
uniform tenor and rules of the common law in similar cases, is to be
adopted, it ought at least to be sustained by one direct adjudication.
In the case of tfunger vs. Tonawanda Railroad Company, the
Supreme Court seem to have gone upon the ground that there was
no distinction between the different degrees of negligence, and that
the defendants could only be made liable for designed and intentional
mischief. The Court of Appeals (contrary to the facts) assumed
that the injury might have been avoided by ordinary care on the
part of the defendants, and held very properly that they were not
bound to exercise it against cattle trespassing upon their road.
Judge Story, in his work on Bailments, says there are three degrees of
negligence, which correspond with the three degrees of Uiligence, and
defines ordinary negligence to be the want of ordinary diligence; slight
negligence, the want of great diligence; and gross negligence the want
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of slight diligence. lie defines ordinary diligence to be that degree
of prudence which men in general exert in respect to their affairs, and
slight diligence to be that which persons of less than common prudence, or of any prudence at all, take of their own concerns. Sir
William Jones says that gross negligence is dolo proximus a practice
equal to fraud. That is that omission of care which even the most
inattentive and thoughtless never fail to take of their own concerns.
Lord Denman, Ch. J., in Lynch vs. .Nurdin, 1 Adolphus and
Ellis, 28, (41 Eng. C. L. 422); "says, between wilful mischief and
gross negligence the boundary line is hard to trace, I would rather
say impossible. The law runs them into each other, considering such
a degree of negligence as some proof of malice. It is then a matter
strictly within the province of the jury deciding on the circumstances
of each case." Where the facts show such a degree of rashness, or
wantonness on the part of the servants of the company, as evinces a
total want of care for the safety of the cattle, or a willingness to
destroy them, though such destruction may not have been intentional, we think it is no departure from justice or principle to hold
the company responsible, unless it appears that the plaintiff was
equally negligent. Any other rule would confer upon railroad
companies special privileges and immunities not enjoyed by private
individuals and other corporations. In the absence of statutes to
the contrary, we understand that their liabilities for wrongs are to be
determined upon the same principles as the liabilities of private
persons.
(Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company vs.
Yeiser, 8 Barr, 366; Burroughs vs. Houtsatonic Railroad Company, 15 Conn. 124 ; BEooker vs. . H. and Northampton Railroad
Company, idem 821.) In the case of the horse or ox of a stranger
trespassing upon the close or land of a private individual, no one
would contend that he would be justified in destroying them by an
act grossly wanton and negligent.
In the absence of a statute requiring it, it is generally well
settled that .railroad companies are not obliged to fence between themselves and adjoining landholders. (Pierce on American Railroad Law, page 321, and cases there cited.) The reason
of the rule is sometimes said to be that the expense of building
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and maintaining fences is allowed to the adjacent owner as
part of the compensation which he receives for the land taken.
This rule of damages was adopted by this court in the case of the
present defendants, plaintiffs in error, vs. Eble, 4 Chand. 72. We
can find no statute, either general or special, imposing upon them
the duty of fencing their road. Under these circumstances, if it had
appeared that the plaintiff had permitted his cattle to be at large
upon or in the vicinity of the road, or had suffered them to range
in places where it was .even remotely probable that they would stroll
upon the track; or if, being present at the time of the injury, and
knowing the danger to which they were exposed, he had made no
effort to remove them; in either case he would have been grossly
and culpably negligent, and not entitled to recover except for willful
injuries. Such negligence by reason of the danger to which it
exposes human life ought to be punished criminally. But who
would say that the owner of stock who has prudently and cautiously
provided against their escape ought, in case they accidently do so,
to be placed on an equality with such a man?
In such case,
although the cattle are technically trespassers, ought not the company
to be held responsible for their wanton and unnecessary destruction ?
The obligation of diligence is relative, and its presence or absence
in one party is required or excused in proportion as it is absent
or present in the other. The care required by the law is in the
party and not in the brute, which though endowed with powers of
locomotion, is not supposed to exercise it.
In Munger vs. The Tonawanda Railroad Company, it is assumed as the rule of law that any negligence on the part of the
plaintiff, no matter what may be its degree, or whether it is remote
or proximate, will defeat his action. An examination of the cases
on this question will show that this assumption is incorrect. The
rule of law in such cases is stated with such great accuracy and
clearness in the case of Trow vs. The Vermont Central Bailroad
Company, 24 Vermont, R. 487, that we cannot do better than to
quote the language of the court. They say : " on this question the
following rules will be found established by the authorities. When
there has been mutual negligence, and the negligence of each party
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was the proximate cause of the injury, no action whatever can be
sustained. In the use of the words 'proximate cause' is meant
negligence occurring at the time the injury happened. In such case,
no action can be sustained by either, for the reason 'that as there
can be no apportionment of damages, there can be no recovery.'
So where the negligence of the plaintiff is proximate and that of the
defendant remote, or consisting of some other matter than what
occurred at the time of the injury, in such case no action can be
sustained, for the reason that the immediate cause was the act of
the plaintiff himself. Under this rule falls that class of cases, where
the injury arose from the want of ordinary and proper care on the
part of the plaintiff at the time of its commission. These principles
are sustained by THill vs. Warren, 2 Stark. R. 377; 7 Met. 274;
12 Met. 415; 5 Hill, 282; 6 Hill, 594 ; Williams vs. Bolland, 6
C.&P. 23. On the other hand, when the negligence of the defendant is proximate, and that of the plaintiff remote, the action can
then well be sustained, although the plaintiff is not entirely without
fault. This seems to be now settled in England and in this country.
Therefore if there be negligence on the part of the plaintiff, yet, if
at the time when the injury was committed it might have been
avoided by the defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, an action will lie for the injury.' " This last rule must of
course be understood to apply only to those cases where the parties
are equal in the exercise of rights, and not to a case where the
plaintiff is a trespasser; for then the defendant would only be held
to see that no damage was done through his gross negligence. It
would however, be applicable to cases of accidents occurring at crossings and such other places on the lines of railroads where men and
animals have the right to be for the purpose of going from one place
to another. There is another rule not mentioned by the court in
that portion of the opinion which we have quoted, but which is
clearly established by the authorities and excludes a recovery. It
is, where the mutual negligence of the parties is the remote cause of
the injury, there being no lack of ordinary care at the time of its
happening. Upon this question, the case from which we have quoted
is exactly in point. There the defendants, who were obliged by
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law to fence their road and provide it with suitable cattle-guards,
had been negligent in omitting to do so. The plaintiff was also
guilty of negligence in permitting his horse, which was destroyed, to
run at large in the highway and the unenclosed land near the railroad track, knowing the condition of the railroad and the danger to
which he was exposed. Inasmuch as no negligence in the manner of
conducting the engine at the time the horse was killed, was shown,
it was held that the action could not be sustained, for the reason
that the negligence which occasioned the death of the horse was as
to both parties, mutual and remote. The cases of )Blythe vs. Topham, Cro. Jac. 158, and .Bush vs. Branaw, 1 Cowen, 78, both
cited in Tonawanda RailroadCompanyvs. Hunger, as well as in
nearly all the modern cases, in support of the doctrine that
plaintiff cannot recover when his own negligence has contributed to
the injury, are both strongly illustrative of this rule. The former
may be regarded as the leading English, and the latter the leading
American case upon this subject. In the former case, the defendant
having dug a pit in a common, the plaintiff's mare, while straying
there fell into it and was killed. After verdict, on motion of the
defendant in arrest of judgment, it was held that the action would
not lie, and judgment was arrested. In the latter case, the defendant had left some maple syrup in buckets in an open shed on his
own unenclosed woodlands. The plaintiff's cow came in the night
and drank the syrup, which caused her death. It was decided that
the plaintiff could not recover. The defendant was held to have
been guilty of negligence in exposing his syrup, and the plaintiff in
permitting his cow to go at large. In both these cases, the negligence of each party was remote and had no immediate or necessary
connection with the injuries. But if in the former, the defendant,
knowing that the plaintiff's mare was straying in the common, without notice or warning to him, had dug the pit, or if in the latter
case the defendant under similar circumstances had exposed the
syrup, who would say that the results would not have been different?
The books abound in eases illustrative of this rule, which it is
unnecessary for us to cite here. The doctrine that there can be no
recovery where the negligence of the parties is mutual and proximate,
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will be found most frequently illustrated in the numerous cases
growing out of collisions between persons and carriages upon public
highways, and boats and vessels upon navigable waters, where the
parties themselves, or their agents or servants were generally
present at the time the injuries were received. The following are
some of the cases of that kind. Bill vs. Warren, 2 Stark. R. 377,
(3 E. 0. L. 390) ; Pluckwell vs. Wilson, 5 Car. & P. 375, (24 E. C.
L. 368); Bass vs. Litton, 5 0. & P. 407, (24 E. 0. L. 384); Luxford
vs. -Large, 5 C. & P. 421, (24 E. C. L. 391); Vanderplank vs. Niller, 1 M. & M. 169, (22 E. 0. L. 280); Williams vs. Holland, 6 0.
& P. 23, (25 E. 0. L. 261); Sills vs. Brown, 9 0. & P. 601, (38 E.
0. L. 245) ; Wolf vs. Beard, 8 C. & P. 373, (34 E. C. L. 435) ;
.awkins vs. Cooper, 8 C. & P. 473, (34 E. 0. L. 485); Lack vs.
Seward, 4 C. & P. 106, (19 E. C. L. 298); Beers vs. Bousatonie
B. B. Co. 19 Conn. R. 566; Monroe vs. Leach, 7 Met. 274.
In addition to the authorities cited by the court in Trow vs.
Vermont Central Railroad Company, to sustain the doctrine that
there can be no recovery when the neglinence of the plaintiff is proximate and that of the defendant remote, or consisting ofsomething other
than what occurred at the time of the injury, the following may be
found. Butterfield vs. Forrester,11 East, 60, Mariott vs. Stanley,
I M. & G. 39 (E. C. L. 559); Platt vs. Wilks, 3 B. & A. 304, (5
E. C. L. 295); and Soick vs. Blackburn, 4 0. & P. 297.
In Butterfield vs. .Forrester,which is the leading case upon this
question, the defendant, for the purpose of making some repairs to
his house which was close by the road, and at one end of the town
had put a pole across a part of the road, leaving a free passage by
another branch or street, in the same direction. The plaintiff left
a public house not far distant from the place in question at eight
o'clock in the evening in August, there being light enough to observe
the obstruction at 100 yards distance, and if he had not been riding
very fast, lie might have observed and avoided it; however he did
not observe, but rode, against it, and fell with his horse and was
much hurt by the accident. There was no evidence that he was intoxicated at the time. The jury were instructed, that if a person riding
with reasonable and ordinary care, could have seen and avoided the
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obstruction, and if they were satisfied the plaintiff was riding along the
street extremely hard and without ordinary care, they should find a
verdict for the defendant, which they accordingly did. On motion
for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, Lord Ellenborough
said, "one person being infault will not dispense with another's using
ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to support this
action; an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and
no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff."
.Davies vs. Mann, 10 Meeson and Welsby's R. 545; Bridge vs. The
Grand Junction Railway Company, 3 id. 244, and Mayor of Colchester vs. Brooke, 7 Adolph. and Ellis, 389, (53 E. 0. L. 339), are
instances of recovery where the plaintiffs were wrong doers, and
remotely negligent, but where the negligent conduct of the defendants
was the immediate cause of the injuries. (See also Bird vs. ilolbrook,
4 Bing. 628; and Johnson vs. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1.) In Daviesvs.
Mann, the plaintiff having fettered the forefeet of a donkey belonging
to him, turned itinto a public highway; and at the time in question,' the
donkey was grazing on the offside of a road about eight rods wide, when
the defendant's wagon with a team of three horses, coming down a slight
descent at what was termed a smartish pace, ran against the donkey,
knocked it down, and the wheels passing over it, it soon diedAlthough the plaintiff's act was both unlawful, and negligent "1still
the defendant was bound to go along the road at such a pace as
would be likely to prevent mischief. Were this not so, a man might
justify the driving over goods left on a public highway, or even
over a man lying asleep there, or the purposely running against a
carriage going on the wrong side of the road." The action was
for carelessly and negligently driving against the donkey, and there
was no pretence that the injury was intentional. The cases of
Lynch vs. Nurdin, supra; Birge vs. Gardiner,19 Conn. 507; and
Robinson vs. Cone, 22 Vt. 213, where this rule seems to have been
reversed, rest upon principles peculiar to themselves. In those cases,
although the negligence of the plaintiffs was proximate and that of
the defendants remote, yet they were permitted to recover on account
of the extreme youth of the plaintiffs and their consequent inability
to exercise ordinary care at the time the injuries occurred.
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The views which we have taken in relation to the liability of railroad companies for negligence have been adopted and sustained by
the English and most of the courts in the American States, as
will be seen by a perusal of the authorities cited below. In many of
the States they have gone much farther, and held that although
cattle are trespassers, they are bound to the exercise of ordinary
care to avoid injuring them. This is holding them to the same degree
of care and caution where cattle are wrongfully as where they are
rightfully upon the track, a rule which we do not think is warranted
by principle. An adherence to the rule which we have adopted,
will, we believe, promote safety to the lives of persons, and to
property so largely entrusted to their care. Collisions and disasters
will be less frequent. The bitterness and animosities which would
be engendered on the part of those suffering wrong by the insolence
and wantonness of companies and their employees, which by the
relaxation of the rule the law would fail to redress, would be productive of far greater evils, than the paltry inconveniences to which
companies may sometimes be subjected could possibly counterbalance.
The following are the cases to which we have above referred.
-ickets vs. Thie -East and West India -Docks and Birmingham
Junction Railway Co., 12 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 520; Perkinsvs.
.EasternB. B. Co., 29 Mee. 807 ; Tackson vs. B. J-B. B. R. Co.,
25 Vt. R. 150; Morse vs. Same, 27 id. 49; Hfurd vs. Same, 25 id.
116; Xorse vs. B. & H., B. B. Co., 2 Cush. R. 534; Beers vs.
Ilousatonic B. B. Co., supra; White vs. Concord B. B., 10 Foster, 188; Trow vs. Vt. C. B. R. supra ; Norris vs. Androscoggin
B. R. Co., 89 Me. 273 ; -Louisville& F. B. B. Co. vs. 1ilton, 14
B. Monroe, R. 75; Housatonic B. B. Co. vs. Waterbury, 23 Conn.
102; -Dannervs. S. C. B. R. Co., 4 Rich, 829; R. B. Co. vs.
Smealth, 8 id. 185; C. J- O B. B. Co. vs. Patchin,16 Ill. 198;
G. IV. R. B. Co. vs. Thompson, 17 id. 131; G & B. . B. B. Co.
vs. Still, 19 id. 499; Vandergrift vs. Rediker, 2 Zab. (N. J.) R. 185;
La Fayette & Ind. R. B. Co. vs. Skinner, 6 Ind. 145; KYerwhacker
vs. C. C. & C. B. R. (o., 3 Ohio State R. 172; C. H. -D. B. B.
Co. vs. Waterson, 4 id. 424; Galena and Chicago Union B.
B. Co. vs. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478. In the latter case, the English and
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American authorities upon injuries arising from negligence are
fully and ably reviewed. The court held "that the question of
liability did not depend absolutely on the absence of all negligence
on the part of the plaintiff, but upon the relative degree of care or
want of care, as manifested by both parties." It is for the jury to
determine, under proper instructions from the court, whether there
has been negligence, and its nature and degree.
It follows from what we have already said, that the last instruction
given for the defendants was erroneous. It precluded a recovery
under any circumstances, for a negligent destruction of the cattle.
The instructions asked by the plaintiff were both properly refused.
The first, for the reason that the plaintiff was proceeding for a negligent and not a willful destruction of his property, and it was not
incumbent on the court to divide the instruction, and give that
part which might have been proper, refusing the residue. The last,
for the reason that the action was not brought for negligence in not
fencing the road, and for the still better reason that the defendants
were not obliged to do so.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and a new trial
awarded.

In the Court of Appeals of the State of KYentucky.
MADDOX AND OTHERS, APPELLANTS, vs. GRAHAM AND KNOX, APPELLEES.
1. Mandamus is the proper legal remedy against a municipal corporation refusing
or neglecting to levy a tax to pay interest on the bonds issued by the corporation.
2. It will be granted on the petition of an individual bondholder.
3. Where a party by his conduct shows he does not intend to do an act required by
law, an express demand and refusal is not necessary before the granting of the
writ of mandamus.
4. It is sufficient to allege in the writ that the petitioner is the owner of bonds with
coupons attached, and unless there be a clear and unequivocal denial of this allegation, no further proof of ownership is necessary.
5. A merely formal departure from the act of the Legislature, in the mode of

framing the bond, will not render it void.
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6. Where the Legislature directed bonds of a city to be made "negotiable and
transferable by the order of the President and Directors" of a railroad company,
and the bonds on their face were made payable to the "company and its assignee
or hearer," such bonds were held to be valid.
7. Acts authorizing subscriptions by corporations are to be construed strictly against
the corporation and in favor of the holders of the bonds..
8. Opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the Allegheny County Bond
cases, cited and adopted.
9. Acts of Legislature authorizing subscriptions by municipal corporations to railroad companies, are constitutional.

The Court being sufficiently advised, delivered the following
opinion:
BY THE COURT.'-By an act of the Legislature of Kentucky,
approved 4th March, 1850, the Maysville and Lexington Railroad
Company was' chartered, with power to construct and maintain a
railway, commencing at any eligible point in or near the city of
Maysville, thence by the most practicable route to or 'near the city
of Lexington.
The 28th section of the act of incorporation conferred upon the
cities of 'Maysville and Lexington, and the counties of Mason,
Nicholas, Bourbon and Fayette, and any other city or corporation,
power and authority to hold stock in the corporation created by
the act, upon the same terms, on the same conditions, and subject
to the same restrictions with other stockholders; provided the
amount by said several cities, counties and corporations, separately
subscribed, shall not in any single instance exceed the following
sums: by Maysville, one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, etc.
Said section contains a further proviso in these words, namely:
that the city council for the city of Maysville may, at any time
after the passage of this act, on giving three weeks' notice thereof
in the newspapers printed in said city, cause a poll to be opened in
the three wards of the city, and the sense of the voters taken as to
the propriety of said city subscribing to the said capital stock of
said road, as provided in this charter; and if a majority of those
voting are in favor, it shall be the duty of the board of council to
subscribe the number of shares provided for in this charter, so soon
as the books shall be opened."
' In the copy furnished us the Judge's name is omitted.-Eds. A. L. Reg.
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In accordance with this proviso, the city council of the city of
Maysville caused the sense of the voters of said city to be "taken
as to the propriety of said city subscribing to the capital stock of
said road as provided in this charter." The citizens of Maysville,
by their unanimous vote, approved this subscription.
Subsequently, viz: on the 23d of April, 1850, the city council
ordered a subscription to the capital stock of said company of one
hundred and fifty thousand dollars. In obedience to this order, the
President of the Council actually made the subscription in the
books of the railroad company.
Availing themselves of the power conferred upon them by said
charter, the counties of Mason, Bourbon and Fayette, and the city
of Lexington, also became subscribers to the capital stock of said
company.
The Legislature, by an act passed as an amendment to the charter of the company, approved 17th February, 1851, authorized the
county court of any county, and the city council of any city, who
shall subscribe stock in said company, under the provisions of the
original act, to execute bond; of the county or city, payable to the
President and Directors of said company, for the amounts severally
subscribed by said counties and cities, payable at such times as may
be deemed best by said county courts and city councils."
. In said amendment it was further enacted, that said courts and
city councils respectively, "shall have power, and it shall be their
duty, severally to levy and collect upon the real and personal property of said counties or cities, an amount, in money, sufficient
annually to pay off the interest on said bonds ; which interest shall
be levied and collected as other taxes are collected in this State,
and by the same collecting officer, under the same penalties," etc.
The bonds authorized by the first section of the amendment to
be executed, were by the same act required to be made negotiable
and transferable.
Under and by virtue of the authority conferred by this amendatory act, the city council of the city of Maysville, by appropriate
and necessary steps and proceedings, executed one hundred and
fifty bonds, each for one thousand dollars. These bonds were
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signed by the President of the City Council, countersigned by the
City Clerk, with the seal of the city attached. They were made
payable to the Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company, assignee
or bearer, were delivered to the company, and received in payment
of the stock subscribed by the city.
Thus were these bonds executed and uttered by the city of Maysville, acting through its constituted authorities, with all the solemn
and formal, as well as substantial acts, which were required by law,
and usual and appropriate in such a case.
In addition to this, it is made apparent by the evidence in the
record, "that at the time the one hundred and fifty bonds were
made and executed by the city of Maysville, and delivered to the
Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company, in payment of its
subscription, it was generally known amongst thepeople of the city
that they were made for sale in the money markets of the country,
and the said bonds were generally praised and commended by the
people of the city as a safe and profitable investment ; they were
also praised and the sale encouraged by the newspapers of the city,
and the sales of the bonds quoted and 'praised in said newspapers at
the time." Extraordinary means were used to give currency and
value in the money markets to these bonds. And it is fair and
legitimate to presume, that the effect of these means, used by the
city of Maysville and its citizens, was to induce the purchase of said
bonds by innocent and bona fide purchasers, for a fair price. Neither before nor at this time, nor for some time after, was a doubt
or question raised as to the legality of all these proceedings, or the
validity of the bonds.
In the language of the Judge of the Circuit Court, in his most
excellent opinion, which has been sent up as part of the record,
"Under these circumstances, and after such conduct on the part of
the city of Maysville, its authorities and citizens, the plaintiffs, now
appellees, it seems, became in good faith and for a valuable consideration, the purchasers and holders of the bonds filed in this
record."
From the time the bonds were issued until July, 1857, the municipal authorities of Maysville regularly levied and collected taxes
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upon the real and personal property of the city, to an amount sufficient to pay all the interest upon the bonds. In fact, the entire
interest prior to the day last named has been paid.
The tax required for the payment of the interest upon the debt
which became due 1st July, 1857, was neither levied nor collected;
and no fund having been otherwise provided, the interest coupons
payable on that day were dishonored. In this state of the case, on
the 26th of October, 1857, the appellees filed their petition in the
Mason Circuit Court, as authorized and provided by title x, chap.
13, of the Civil Code of Practice, praying the writ of mandamus,
directed to the city council, commanding the levy and collection of
the taxes which were enjoined upon them by law.
After the filing of this petition, a change occurred in the members constituting the board of the city council. The new board
also failed to levy and collect the tax as their predecessors had
done. The interest coupons due 1st January, 1858, became due
and were left unpaid, and were protested. Afterwards the appellees
filed an amended petition, .setting forth the facts which had
occurred since the filing of their original petition. The members of
the new as well as the old board were made defendants, and notice
of the application for the mandamus on the third day of the April
term, 1858, was given.
Three of the defendants, who were members of the council of
1857, filed their joint answer to the petitions, in which they admitted
the truth of all the material allegations, acknowledged the obligation, legal and moral, which rested upon the council to provide the
means necessary for the payment of the debt of the city, evidenced
by her one hundred and fifty bonds aforesaid, in the mode prescribed
by the law under which the bonds were issued, admitted the delinquency of the council as a body, averred that they had always been
ready and willing to perform the duty which the law had enjoined
upon the council.
On behalf of the other defendants, elaborate and very full
answers were filed, in which the right of the appellees to the relief
sought in their petitions, was resisted upon numerous grounds, most,
if not all of which, will be noticed hereafter.
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Upon the hearing, a peremptory mandamus was awarded to the
applicants, commanding and requiring the board of councilmen of
the city of Maysville, composed of Jonathan R. Paddock, Thaddeus
C. Campbell, George 11. Orr, James F. Willett, Wm.II. MeGranaban, Simon Nelson, Alexander Maddox, Franklin MeClanahan, and
William W. Lamar, to levy and collect, upon the real and personal
property of the city of Maysville, an amount sufficient to pay the
interest aforesaid which had accrued and remained unpaid.
From that judgment the appeal now before the court is prosecuted.
The grounds assumed by the appellants, upon which they ask
a reversal of the judgment of the Circuit Court, may be most
appropriately and conveniently considered in two general classes,
namely:
1. Those which relate to and affect the remedy; and.
2. Those upon which the right of appellees to any relief whatever,
no matter by what remedy it may be sought, is denied.
First, as to the remedy.
Under this head, the ground mainly relied upon and most earnestly urged in argument by the counsel of appellants is, "that
the writ of mnandamus is not the proper remedy to afford the relief
to which the plaintiffs (appellees) are entitled, conceding that they
are entitled to any relief,"-which, however, is not conceded by
the appellants in fact, but will for the present be assumed for the
purpose of argument.
It seems to us that the authorities upon this point are altogether
conclusive.
Bacon lays it down thus: "If the party making the application
has a right, a legal right and no other speefie legal remedy, this
will not be denied." Bacon's Abridgment, vol. 6, tit. Mandamus,
p. 418, et passim.
The remedy must be specific-" a specifie," adapted peculiarly
and exactly to the accomplishment of the particular object desired.
If there be no remedy like this, the writ of mandamus "will not
be denied."
Blackstone says, "it issues in all cases where the party hath a
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right to have anything done, and bath no other specific means of
compelling its performance." Black. Com., vol. 3, p. 100; Tapping on Mandamus, chap. 2, pp. 9, 10.
"It is a general rule, that whenever an act of the legislature
gives power to, or imposes an obligation on a particular person,
to do some particular act or duty, and provides no specific legal
remedy for non-performance, the court will, in order to prevent a
failure of justice, grant the writ to command the doing of such act
or duty." Commonwealth of Penna. ex rel. Thomas vs. The Commissioners of Allegheny County-reported in the American Law
Register for December, 1858. Tapping on Mandamus, Man. p. 30.
In Angell & Ames, after a statement of many particular cases
in which mandamus lies, it is said, "The writ of mandamus lies,
too, to compel a corporation or its officers to do many acts which,
by general law, or by virtue of official station, .they are bound to
do, which the party prosecuting the writ has a right to have done,
and for which there is no other adequate, specific, legal remedy.
Angell & Ames on Corporations, see. 707, p. 715.
Now let us apply these principles to the case before the court:
The appellees were the holders of the bonds of the city of Maysville, the interest upon which they were entitled to receive semiannually, at the rate of six per centum per annum. The statute
which authorized the execution, issue and circulation of these
bonds, lirescribed the mode in which the money necessary for
the payment of this interest was to be raised. It imposed upon
certain functionaries of the city the obligation and duty of raising
this money. The city council was "authorized and required to
levy and collect, upon the real and personal property of the city,
an amount, in money, sufficient annually to pay off the interest
on said bonds."
Here was a right, a legal right, vested in the appellees, who
were holders of the bonds. They had a right to receive the interest, and they had a right to have the tax levied and collected for
its payment. What other specific legal remedy had they for the
enforcement of this clear and undoubted right? Had they a
specific for the evil of which they complained ? Had they a remedy
48
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adapted peculiarly and exactly to the accomplishment of the particular object desired ?
These interrogatories can receive none but a negative answer.
There was no other mode in which these delinquent officers of the
city could be compelled to perform the duties enjoined upon them
by law.
To exclude the use of mandamus, because there is another
remedy, it must be one against the same parties. Tapping, side
page 19.
How otherwise than by this remedial writ could the appellants
have been coerced to the performance of their official duty ? It
was not a judgment in their favor, against the city, for the amount
of the unpaid interest, that the appellees asked in their petition.
They asked that public officers, the city council of Maysville,
authorized and required by law to levy and collect, as taxes, an
amount in money sufficient to pay the interest upon the railroad
bonds of the city, should be compelled to perform this duty. We
have had occasion before to observe that the supreme law-making
power of the State had given power to and imposed an obligation
on the city council to do a particular act or acts, that by the
statute no specific legal remedy had been provided for non-performance. Certainly, according to our authority above quoted,
the court will, in order to prevent a failure of justice, grant the
writ, to "command the doing of the act or acts" enjoined by the
statute.
In all of their essential and distinguishing features, the case of the
Justices of Clark vs. The Paris, Winchester and Kentucky River
Turnpike Road Company, (11 B. Monroe, 143,) and the case at
bar, very closely resemble each other. We allude to the features
necessary to be considered in determining the remedy.
In the former, it was decided by this court, (11 B. Monroe,
page 154,) that mandamus was the appropriate, and indeed only
remedy for compelling a county court to comply with its duty
and obligation to levy money to pay their subscription to
the stock of a turnpike road company. In Auditor vs. Ben
Hardin, (8 B. Monroe, page 648,) the powers and duties of the
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Circuit Courts in reference to writs of mandamus, are very clearly
stated. The reasoning of the opinion in that case, and the authorities therein cited, show this to be an appropriate case for a mandamus.
II. But it is insisted that the proper parties were not before
the court on the motion. It is said that the railroad company
was a necessary party. We do not perceive that the company had
any interest in this particular controversy. Certainly, in order
to a complete and satisfactory disposition of the application for a
mandamus, it was not necessary that the company be a party.
Nor was it necessary that the tax-payers of the city should be
made parties. It was not proposed by this proceeding to operate
upon them, but upon the city council only. And the council alone
had the right to be heard in opposition to the application.
It was not necessary the other holders of the railroad bonds
should be parties because their interest could be as well represented
by the applicants for the writ as if they were themselves parties.
The Allegheny bond case is an authority for awarding the writ
upon the application of one bondholder, he holding two bonds of
an issue of three hundred.
There was no need that the proceeding should have been in the
name of the commonwealth. This is shown conclusively by the
Civil Code, sec. 526 :
" The writ * * * * * * is granted on the motion of the party
aggrieved, or of the commonwealth, when the public interest is
affected." The applicants in this case were certainty "parties
aggrieved," and the writ might well be granted on their application or motion.
It is not a case in which it is required, that the commonwealth
be a party.
Generally, if not universally, in Kentucky, applicants. for' the.
aid of the writ have made motions in their own names.
See all the reported cases.
III. It is urged with earnestness in argument for appellants,
that it was erroneous in the Circuit Court to grant the writ, because actions had been brought by the appellees, against the city
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of Maysville, upon the coupons which were due and unpaid. To
this it seems only necessary to say, by way of answer, in addition
to what has already been said of the difference in the remedies,
that when the writ of mandamus was awarded, the actions at law
upon the coupons werenot pending. They were dismissed on the
10th day of April, and the judgment upon the motion for a mandamus was not rendered until the 29th April, 1858. So that if
these actions ever did stand in way of relief upon the motion, they
were removed before action by the court upon the motion. There
was no lie pendens at the time the writ was awarded.
Upon this point, see Tapping, side p. 28.
IV. This brings us to consider another question which is argued
at length by the counsel of appellants, namely-did the court err,
"1in hearing evidence to controvert the statements of facts in the
defendant's answer or return ?"
In the commencement of their argument upon this point, it
seems to us that counsel have committed a capital error, in assuming that the common law in reference to mandamus is yet in force
in Kentucky without change. Assuming this to be so, it is now
contended that the Circuit Court could not try the truth of the
matters, stated in the answer, but if a cause legally sufficient were
stated in the answer, it must be assumed by the court to be true,
and decline to proceed further on the mandamus. The cases of
Goheen vs. Mtyers, (18 B. Monroe, 426,) and County Court of
Anderson vs. Stone d Son, Ibid. 852, are relied upon to sustain
this view.
These cases seem to have been totally misconceived.
That the court entertained a different opinion, is manifest from
this sentence in the opinion in Cdunty Court of Anderson vs.
Stone.
This language is used by the court: "consequently the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, to hear the application and award the
,writ, if it were authorized by the testimony, was unquestionable."
" If it were authorized by the testimony."
Undeniably this implies that the court had the right to hear the
testimony, and decide thereupon the facts of the case.
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Afterwards the effect of the testimony and result of the trial are
stated by the court.
It is stated as proved that the bridge as built is not worth as
much as has been paid to the plaintiffs for the building of it; that
it is essentially defective, etc., etc.
And then follows the court's conclusion:
"1Under these circumstances-i. e. in view of the proof, of the
facts as the court upon trial has found them to exist, the plaintiff's
motion should have been dismissed, unless the defendants have
done some act by which they are precluded from relying upon this
defence."
The tenor and effect of the entire opinion goes to show that the
court did not entertain the opinion imputed by the counsel of
appellants.
oheen vs. .11yers, there is nothing inconsistent with the
In
interpretation we here give to the opinion in the County Court of
Anderson vs. Stone & Son.
Whether the statute of 7 Ann was ever in force in this country,
or not, it is not necessary now to decide. If not before, the common law was certainly changed by our statute, approved January
8, 1813. Litt. 5, vol. 11.; and M. & B. Stat. vol. 1, p. 522.
The second section of that act makes it lawful for the person,
at whose instance a mandamus has been, or may be thereafter
issued in any case, to traverse the truth of the whole, or any one
more of the facts asserted in the return made to the writ, etc.
A trial by jury was then provided for:
And by the-third section of the act, it was made the duty of the
court entertaining jurisdiction, as before stated in the act, upon
the result of the finding by the jury, to pronounce judgment thereon
in favor of either party, according to law.
There can be no mistaking the effect of this enactment. It was
not repealed by the revised statutes, being within the exceptions
from the repealing clause.
So far as it is inconsistent with, or within the purview of the
provisions of the Code of Practice upon the same subject, it was
repealed by the adoption of the Code. But the Code of Practice,
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chapter 13, of title x, contains in substance the same provisions
as the act of 1813.
The court shall hear and decide all questions of law or facts
arising on the motion, and the granting or refusing the writ shall
be the final order on the motion. Sec. 524, 0. P.
Unquestionably the legislature intended that the answer should
be traversable, and that the court should have the power to hear
evidence controverting and supporting the statements of the answer,
and then to decide all questions of law and facts arising on the
motion.
The writ of mandamus is not now as formerly, a high prerogative
writ, emanating from the grace or favor of any one. But is a
statutory writ or order of a court of competent jurisdiction, and,
in a proper case, is to be granted on the motion of any party
aggrieved.
There is no error upon this point.
V. It is said that there never has been any actual refusal to
levy the tax, conseqiently no motion for a mandamus can be
entertained.
It was the duty of the council to have levied the tax. They
failed and neglected to levy it, and the coupons for the interest
due 1st July, 1857, and 1st January, 1858, were left unpaid, and
allowed to be dishonored.
In this, certainly, there was violation of duty and neglect of
obligation.
But this was not all. An ordinance providing for the collection
of the tax had been passed by the board. Subsequently this
ordinance was repealed, notwithstanding the strong opposition of
a minority of the board.
The proof shows that the council was appealed to by memorial
to levy the tax. They declined to do so, and it was said to the
person who presented the memorial, that there was no probability
that they would levy the tax. They were repeatedly urged to the
levy, but with no effect.
It has been held, that the rescinding an original resolution on
which a dispatch was framed, is equivalent to an absolute refusal
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to transmit such dispatch, and sufficient to authorize the court to
entertain the subject matter of the mandamus. King vs. Northleach Roads, 5 Barn. & Ald.982. This is approved by Tapping,
side p. 286.
So if it be clear from the acts of the defendant, that he does
not intend to comply with the demand, a statement of the facts
upon which supposition of the prosecutor is based, will be considered by the court as tantamount to a refusal. An express and
explicit refusal, in terms is not necessary to put the party in fault.
It will be sufficient that his conduct makes it apparent that he
does not intend to do the act required.
The pleadings and proof make it quite clear that the council
had no intention to levy the tax; indeed that they were resolved
not to do so. In their answer in this case, appellants avow that
they are resisting the payment of this railroad debt, and say that
in doing so, they "are acting in obedience to a solemn conviction
of public duty."
In the face of the record, it seems to the court almost frivlous,
to say "there had never been any actual refusal to levy the tax."
VI. We do not esteem it a valid objection to the judgment of
the Circuit Court, that the terms of office of the board of 1857
had expired, and that a new board, composed in part of different
members had been formed.
Virtually, this is a proceeding against the corporation, and the
judgment is obligatory on the members of the board of councilmen
in office at the time of its rendition. It may assume the character
of an individual proceeding, if it becomes necessary to enforce the
orders of the Circuit Court by attachment or other process, for
contempt. But a change in the membership of the board does not
so change the parties as to abate the proceeding.
The constituent parts of the board may not be the same, but the
City of Louisville vs.
representative body remains identical.
Kean, &c., 18 B. Mon. 18.
VII. In regard to the ownership of the bonds and coupons,
we deem it sufficient that it was alleged positively by the petitioners that they were the owners of the bonds and coupons, the plea
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intended to put in question is "uncertain and equivocal," and
the bonds and coupons were produced on the trial by the petitioners.
Second. Having disposed of the various objections taken by
appellants to the remedy, of which the appellees seek to avail
themselves, and to the -time and mode of its invocation, we come
now to consider the grounds which go more peculiarly to the merits
of the case; which touch the very cause of action or complaint,
and upon which appellants deny that appellees have any rights at
all, to be redressed by any remedy whatever.
The first of these grounds, presented in argument, is that the
subscription of the city of Maysville, of one hundred and fifty
thousand dollars to the capital stock of the Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company, is void.
In support of this position it is argued, first, that the city of
Maysville had no power to make this subscription, previously to
the enactment of the Maysville and Lexington Railroad charter.
We take it to be quite certain that this proposition is true, and
that no one will controvert it.
And, second, we admit in all of its force the familiar doctrine
that a corporation being the mere creature of law, possesses only
those properties and powers, which the charter of its creation, or
some amendment or addition thereto confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its existence and legitimate actionand where a corporation is directed or allowed to do any act, and
the mode, in which the act is to be done, is prescribed, that the
mode so prescribed must substantially and in good faith be pursued.
" The act of incorporation is an enabling act; it gives to the
body corporate all the power it possesses," etc., etc. Angell &
Ames, 327.
With the directions of such acts there must be a compliance
substantial and bonafide.
And whether that "persons dealing with the managers of a
corporation, must take notice of the limitations imposed upon their
authority by the act of incorporation." Pearce vs. iliad. and
Indianapolis and the Peru and Ind. Bailroad Companies; in
the Supreme Court of the United States, September, 1858, reported in the American Law Register for May, 1859.
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If, in an act of incorporation, a specified act is directed to be
done by a yarticularagent, it must be done by that agent.
"In construing an act to establish a private corporation, it is a
rule of law that it must be construed strictly, as against the corporation, but liberally in favor of the public."
These are admitted principles about which there
can be no controversy, except possibly as to their application.
But it is quite certain that the statutes (cited supra) gave to
the corporation of the city of Maysville, the power to hold stock
in the Maysville and Lexington Railroad Company-to become
indebted to the company for the stock which might be subscribed,
and to execute the bonds of the city for the amount of the stock.
The question as to the power of the cities and counties, authorized to hold stock in said railroad company and to issue bonds,
was fully considered by this court in the case of Slack and others
vs. .Jaysville and Lexington Railroad Company, 13 B. Mon. 1.
In that case it was decided that the amendatory act of 17th February, 1851, applied to the subscription of the Mason County
Court which had been made prior to the passage of the act; and
that, without the amendatory act, the court might, under the
authority of the original act of 1850, "have issued the bonds of
the county in some form," which bonds, with the assent of the
company, could at once have been transferred to them in payment
of the subscription of the company for stock.
This is virtually and to all intents a decision as to the powers
of the city of Maysville under the two statutes, because the city
and county stood in precisely the same attitude.
In this connection it is appropriate further to remark, that the
bonds issued by the county of Mason, and the city of Maysville,
were exactly similar in form and substance-in tenor and effect.
And the various questions now made in reference to the city bonds
were then made in reference to the county bonds, and were considered and decided.
For many and very sound and potential reasons, not necessary
here to be enumerated, this court now recognizes the duty incumbent upon them of respecting and following that decision.

MADDOX ET AL. vs. GRAHAM & KNOX.

The laws of our commonwealth are not altered, with every
change of those who are chosen by the citizens to administer them.
Nor are they affected by the mutations of public sentiment in
regard to measures for public improvement, or any other measures,
or the acts of individuals concerning those measures, except so far
as those mutatiois of public opinion are manifested in the form of
legislation.
The city possessing the power, then, as we have seen, to execute
her bonds for the payment of her subscription to the railroad company, and having executed the power, has she done so in the mode
pointed out by the statutes by which the power was conferred?
1. It is said that the subscription to the stock of the company,
made on behalf of the city, was void, because it should have been
made by the Mayor of Maysville. That the mayor was the agent
appointed by the statute to perform the act of subscription, and
the act not having been performed by the agent designated by the
statute, it was and is void; and the city was not bound to pay the
subscription,
This point is settled by the 28th section of the act chartering
the railroad company.
By the first proviso of that section, (there being four distinct
and separate provisos therein,) after the result of the popular vote,
directed to be taken upon the propriety of the subscription, is
ascertained, it is made the duty of the mayor and council of every
city, wherein a majority of all the qualified voters have cast their
votes in favor of the subscription, to pass an ordinance directing
the mayor, on behalf of such city, to subscribe, etc.
This proviso is general and relates to all cities and counties
embraced in the act.
The fourth proviso is very different. It is special and relates
to the city of Maysville alone.
By this proviso the city council for the city of Maysville is
authorized and directed to cause a poll to be opened to take the
sense of the voters as to the propriety of the subscription proposed
by the city, etc.
And the proviso in conclusion enacts, " if a majority of those
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voting are in favor, it shall be the duty of the board of council to
subscribe the number of shares provided for in this charter so soon
as the books shall be opened."
Is it possible that language can be plainer or more unequivocal
than this ?
The board of council is unmistakably appointed the "agent"
to make the subscription.
It seems to the court hardly to need an argument to prove, that
the act of subscription was performed by the agent really appointed by the statute. But, if it did, and we apply the identical
rules of construction laid down by the counsel of appellants, in
construing this statute, it appears to be impossible to arrive at
any other conclusion than the one to which the Circuit Court
came.
The first rule relied upon is this: Every statute must be so
construed as to give effect to the in tention of the legislature; if
that intention is apparent, or can be ascertained from the statute
itself.
The intention of the legislature in enacting the last proviso is
now the particular object of inquiry. To ascertain that, we look
fi-st to the proviso itself. Looking to that, there would seem to
be no room for doubt as to what the intention was. The language
employed is so brief, so plain, so totally free from ambiguity,
there seems no pretext for hesitation or uncertainty as to the intention of the legislature expressed therein. If any other meaning is to be attributed to it than that which the language plainly
imports, it devolves upon those who insist upon the different interpretation to prove conclusively that the legislature meant something else, and to show what they did mean. This, appellants
have failed to do.
It is not doubted by any one that this proviso confers power
upon the council to give notice of and hold the election previously
provided for. Is the grant of power to make the subscription less
explicit, or any more to be doubted? Indeed, the language is in
its nature imperative. It imports a command to the board of
council.
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Are appellants at liberty to deny that, in this proviso, the
council alone was authorized to subscribe, when previously the
authority was to the mayor and council, simply because they cannot find a reason for the change satisfactory to themselves ?
The intention of the legislature is palpable on the very face of
the act. It needs no process of reasoning to eliminate it.
And wherein the last proviso is repugnant to the first, the last
must prevail.
Tested by the second rule laid down by the counsel of appellants, their construction is not more tenable.
The rule as laid down by Blackstone is, that "one part of a
statute must be so construed by another, that the whole may (if
possible) stand est res magis valeat, quam 2ereat." 1 Black. Com.
Mar. p. 80.
Now by the construction contended for on behalf of appellants,
one part of the statute, exceedingly important and significant, is
completely destroyed.
A distinct and substantive portion of the last proviso of the
28th section is annulled by a former provision.
We understand the rule to be, that when two parts of the same
statute are irreconcilably opposed to each other, the last in order
of time being the most recent expression of the will of the legislature, is to be held the law in" preference to the first. But the
argument of appellant's counsel reverses this rule. They say
there is such an opposition between the two parts,-but the last
must give place to the first; and that, too, when the last is quite
as positive and unequivocal in terms, and distinct and clear in its
meaning as the first. Surely this is not to be allowed.
The construction of the Circuit Court is far more natural, does
less violence to the statute as it stands, and complies more strictly
with the rule.
The first proviso relates to counties and other cities than Maysville. The last concerns the City of Maysville only.
The construction of the Circuit Court allows the entire statute
to remain intact, except so much of the first proviso of the 28th
section as relates to Maysville. What is enacted concerning the
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several counties and county courts, and the City of Lexington
and its Mayor and Council, remains unchanged.
Not a word of it is lost or destroyed.
But the legislature, for reasons -no doubt perfectly satisfactory
to the members, by the last proviso modified so much of the first
as relates to Maysville. The City Council was authorized to perform certain acts, which according to the first proviso might have
been performed, and, indeed, should have been performed; some
by the railroad company, and others by the mayor and council of
the city. In enacting this proviso, the legislature had in its mind
but a single corporation,-namely, the City of Maysville.
It cannot be doubted that there was entertained a well-defined
purpose as to the powers and duties of this corporation; and that
this purpose is fairly expressed in the language which the legislature has employed. We do not feel at liberty to decide that it
was the purpose of that body to do either more or less than its
language in this proviso plainly shows to have been done.
The court does not perceive any good reason why the board of
council could not just as well have made the subscription as the
mayor and council. It was purely a ministerialact.
It was but carrying into execution the judgment and determination of the qualified voters of the city, expressed with perfect unanimity at the polls.
The act makes it the duty of the board of council to subscribe,
etc., "if a majority of those voting are in favor" of the subscription. And it matters little who actually signed the obligation in
behalf of the city in the book of the railroad company, or whether
there was such signature at all. The substantial and significant
acts had been performed before. Justices of Clark vs. P. WT. &
Ky. T. B. B. Co. supra. See also upon this point and others involved in this case, the opinion of Justice Grier, in the case of
MeCoy vs. Washington County, tried in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, reported
in the Legal Intelligencer for December, 1858. At all events,
this was manifestly the opinion of the legislature. And acting
upon that opinion, they have enacted a statute which is not to be
evaded by far-fetched reasoning or forced construction.
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So far, therefore, as the conclusion (that the bonds and coupons
are void) is attempted to be drawn from the assumed fact, that the
subscription of the city to the stock of the company was unauthorized and void, made as it was, there is a complete failure, because
the premise is not established. The subscription was not void, but
valid and obligatory.
Again,-It is contended by the appellants that the bonds and
coupons which were issued by the council were different, not only
in form, but in their spirit and effect, from the bonds which were
authorized by the Act of the General Assembly, and which alone
the counties and cities were authorized to execute, and are therefore void, vesting no right in the holder, and imposing no obligation upon the corporation.
The first specification under this general head is this,-that the
bonds are made payable to "The ifaysville and Lexington Bailroad Company," whereas the amended charter provides that they
shall be made payable to the president and directors of said company.
And numerous authorities are cited to show, that when a corporation relies upon a grant of power from the legislature for authority to do an act, it is restricted to the mode prescribed by the
statute for its exercise.
This seems to us to be an objection of the merest form. There
is really and in fact no departure from the substance and essence
of the mode prescribed by the statute.
What eonceivable difference can there be between bonds made
payable to "the company," and bonds payable to the "president and directors" of the same company? In either case they
are the property of the company, and no more in one case than
the other. They will not be more injurious or burdensome to the
city in one case than the other.
Certainly it could not have been the intention of the legislature
to have the bonds made payable to "the president and directors
of the company," so as to invest them, as individuals, with the
right to the bonds. Obviously and undeniably the purpose was to
make the bonds the property of the corporation,-the railroad
company.
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This object has been effectually accomplished, and in a mode
not essentially different from the one prescribed by the statute.
In -Pendleton,etc., vs. the Bank of Kentucky, 1 Mon. 175, it
was decided by this court, that a bond payable to "the President
and Directors of the Bank of Kentucky" is a bond payable to the
corporation, notwithstanding the corporate name of the institution
was "the President, Directors, and Company of the Bank of Kentucky."
We apprehend the decision would have been the same, if the
bond had been payable to "the Bank of Kentucky."
Would it not be, in the language of Judge Mills, in the case just
cited, repugnant to the principles of justice to permit parties contracting with corporations to avoid their contracts, and corporations to avoid their own grants, for small errors and omissions
in stating the corporate name?
The error in this case, if there is one, is not the error of the
corporation or party to which the bonds were executed, but of the
corporation or party which made the bonds.
This case, although it may not be in terms exactly like the case
of Pendleton vs. the Bank of -entucky, is within the principle
and spirit of that case.
There is no variance in the mode which will authorize the court
to decide that the bonds are void. Such a decision would be "repugnant to the principles of justice."
The second objection specified under this head, that the bonds
were made payable upon their face to the company and its
"assignee or bearer," is not more tenable. The act of the 17th
February, 1851, directs that the bonds authorized thereby shall
be negotiable and transferable by the order of the president and
directors of said company.
The company might, by its endorsement, have made them payable to bearer. This no one will question. If such an endorscment could well be made by the company, we see no reasonable
objection to the city, by agreement with the company, making the
bonds on their face payable to the assignee of the company, or the
bearer of the bond.
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Sale in the money markets of this or foreign countries, was the
very purpose for which the bonds were made. This purpose was
known to the makers of the law by which they were authorized.
The more certainly to accomplish this purpose, it was provided
that the bonds were to be made negotiable and transferable. As
many as possible of the elements of circulation were to be imparted to them. It seems to us that no more was done than the
law authorized to be done.
The law required the bonds to be made "negotiable;" by being
made payable to "bearer" they were inade "negotiable" by delivery.
In obedience to the express letter of the law, they were made
transferable by assignment or delivery.
All this is in accordance, not only with the law under which the
bonds were issued, but with the well known usage of the country
in reference to such instruments.
The bonds, we are authorized to presume, derived an additional
value from their peculiar form. Maysville, so far from being injured, must have been benefited thereby.
The third specification under this head is two-fold: 1. That
the bonds and coupons were made payable in New York; 2. That
the interest was made payable semi-annually.
Upon this specification we may remark, first, that it is not perceived how the law has been violated in either of the points. It
is nowhere, and in no language, enacted that the bonds or coupons
shall be made payable at Maysville, or any other point. No place
of payment is fixed by any of the statutes. Upon this point they
are silent. Evidently it was the intention of the Legislature to
leave the place at which the bonds and coupons should be made
payable, to the uncontrolled discretion of the makers of the bonds.
This being true, the functionaries of Maysville had as complete
authority to make New York the place of payment as Maysville,
or any other point.
We do not think there is any warrant for the conclusion that
the city and county authorities were allowed no discretion as to
the place of payment, merely because it is said that the bonds may
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be made payable at such times as may be deemed best by said
county courts and city councils. The expression of discretion
upon one point does not exclude all idea of discretion upon every
other point.
It must be presumed that the members of the Legislature had
knowledge of the mode in which these bonds are usually made.
It is a well known fact, that all such securities, and the coupons
for the interest upon them, are made payable almost, if not quite,
universally in our great commercial metropolis. And they are so
made because the bonds are sold more readily, and fbr much better prices, than if payable at one of our far interior towns or cities,
or if no place of payment is fixed. They have a higher and far more
certain commercial value, by reason of the fact that principal and
interest are payable at such a point as New York.
This being known to the members of the Legislature, it is not
to be presumed that they deemed it necessary to say anything
about discretion upon this point in the act.
But time of payment was not so well fixed by custom. Time
would more likely be a matter for negotiation between buyer and
seller of the bonds, thanplace of payment. One capitalist would
prefer them payable at long time, another at a shorter time. And
the value and vendibility of the bonds would be liable to variation
according to the peculiar and different views of different buyers
There was therefore an .obvious propriety in giving, in express
terms, a discretion as to the time of payment.
Suppose the act had been silen upon this point? Would it have
been doubted that the county courts and city councils had the authority to use their own discretion as to the times wheh the bonds
should be payable. We presume not; and if not, is, there more
rea.on to deny that they had the right to use their discretion as to
the 1ace of payment, when the right was not expressly given in
the statute ?
In regard to the second portion of this specification, we think it
quite as clear that the statute, when properly understood, does not
require that the interest upon the bonds shall be made payable
yearly/, and not otherwise.
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It is true that the first section of the act of 1851, provides that
it shall be the duty of the county courts and city councils "severally to levy and collect * * * * * an amount in money sufficient
annually to pay off the interest on said bonds. This means, only
that in each and every year an amount sufficient to pay all the
interest which will accrue during the year shall be levied and collected.
The second section provides that the "interest to become due
yearly" shall be raised by taxation.
Evidently this provision is the equivalent of that just quoted
from the first section. In neither of them was it the purpose of
the Legislature to fix a time at which the interest on the bonds was
to be paid, whether quarterly, half-yearly, or yearly. To regulate
the exact and particular times at which the interest on the bonds
was to become due and payable, was not within their thoughts.
The object intended to be accomplished by these provisions was
that the interest which would accrue in each and every year, whether annually or semi-annually it did not matter, should be met
by a tax levied and collected within the year, upon the real and
personal property of the city, to provide surety that the accruing
interest should be paid by taxation, and to fix the mode of levying
and collecting the tax.
One of the rules of construction relied upon in argument by
the counsel of appellants, may be here referred to as peculiarly
pertinent. The rule is this: An act to establish a private corporation must be construed strictly as against the corporation, but
literally in favor of the public. The argument of appellants
reverses this rule. Their mode of construction is strict against
the public, and liberal in favor of their corporation. It must be
remembered that this is a contest between the corporation represented by its officers, on the one side, and the public represented
by t6e bondholders on the other.
It is further to be observed that all of these questions which
relate to the form of the bonds, to whom payable, where payable,
etc., are settled by the case of Slack and others vs. Tie 1l]aysville
and Lexington Railroad Company, supra. In that case there arose
questions in regard to the Mason County Bonds, precisely simi-
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lar to those now presented. They were decided in favor of the
legality of the act of the Mason County Court, and of the legality
of the county bonds. The decisions of these questions must now
be held decisive of the questions made here, precisely similar.
But it is urged that the city council should not be required to
levy and collect a tax from the tax-payers of Maysville to pay
the interest on the bonds, or the coupons held by the appellees,
because the consideration, which was secured by the charter to
the tax-payer, as an equivalent for the sums so paid by him for
that purpose, has failed.
No failure of consideration is made to appear, which constitutes a sufficient defence to this proceeding.
The appellees produced upon the trial the bonds of which they
claimed to be the holders, with the coupons attached. Their execution is not denied, but admitted, and that they were delivered
to the railroad company in payment of the stock subscribed by
the city, and to be used by the company to raise money for the
construction of the road.
We have decided that the city council had the power to bind
the city, and did bind the city, for the payment of the principal,
and of course the interest of these bonds. The obligation to pay
the interest would be found in the bonds themselves, without the
coupons. But they are appended to the bonds as the appointed
evidence agreed upon by the parties, to show who is entitled as
holder of the bond to receive the interest due at a particular date.
They are a modern invention, intended for the convenience of the
payers of the bonds, and of the persons who may be the holders.
They are evidence of debt in the hands of the holder, and proof
of payment in the hands of the debtor. They are made payable
to bearer, and were attached to the bonds to facilitate their negotiation, and therefore add to their value. They pass by delivery;
and by the contract of the parties, and the well-established usage
of the country, are sufficient evidence of a debt to the holder, as
against the obligors in the bonds. Me Coy vs. Washingtonr County
7 Am. Law Reg. 193. They have the same Consideration to support them that the bonds have.
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Appellants seem to suppose that the certificates of stock which
tax-payers were to receive, as provided for by the charter, constituted the consideration of the bonds; that these were the equivalents to be received by the tax-payers for the sums paid for interest on the bonds.
This is a mistake. The Corporation of Maysville subscribed
for a certain number of shares of the capital stock of the company. For this stock the city was bound to pay.
Under the express authority of the Act of 17th of February,
1851, the bonds of the city were issued directly to the company,
in payment of the subscription to the stock of the company.
When so received, the city became entitled to her stock.
And this stock constituted the consideration for the bonds.
As the tax-payer pays his taxes to meet the interest on the
bonds, he is entitled to stock pro tanto, and to his certificates, as
provided in the charter.
That the railroad enterprise has failed; that the stock has lost
all value; that the company has become insolvent, and its franchises and property have been sold; that the corporation is defunct, and no longer maintains an organization through which to
issue certificates of stock to tax-payers, when entitled to them ;
these may all be facts, and yet not facts which would constitute a
good defence to an action upon one of the city bonds, or upon a
coupon. Nor do they constitute a defence upon which appellants
can or ought, either legally or morally, to resist the relief sought
against them.
It has been expriessly decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa,
that "the purchaser of a county bond, issued in payment of subscriptions to the capital stock of a railway corporation, has nothing to do with the fact that the company, since the issuing of the
bond, has become insolvent, or may have been dissolved." Clapp
vs. T e County of Cedar, Western Law Monthly for January.
In that case, other points-similar to some raised in the case now
before the court-are ruled as they have been here.
That the citizens of Maysville miscalculated as to the ability of
the railroad company to achieve this darling enterprise of theirs;
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that they themselves have acted hastily, without prudent forethought and discretion, and made a bad bargain; that the money
for which the bonds were sold was squandered by the company,
and is a total loss, are no answer to the innocent and bona fide
bond-holder, who has parted with his money for them, when he
demands payment of either principal or interest of the bonds.
The city owes the debt, and is bound alike in law and good
morals to pay it, with the interest, as that accrues.
It is an imperative duty, devolved by law upon these appellants
to provide in the prescribed mode for the prompt payment of this
interest. It is no less a duty to the performance of which they
should feel impelled by every dictate of morality and honor. A
duty to themselves; a duty to the city and citizens of the city
whose officers they are; a duty to the holders of the bonds; and
a high duty to the public, which is vitally interested in its prompt
and faithful discharge.
It is moreover a duty, from the performance of which they cannot escape, so long as the Courts of our State remain true to the
law and resolute and firm in the discharge of their duties.
We will not enlarge upon the moral view of the case, which has
been so justly and aptly treated by the Circuit Judge,-himself a
citizen of Maysville.
He has manifested a thorough and earnest, as well as accurate,
appreciation of the subject. We now dispose of it with the expression of our hearty and unqualified approval of every word
contained in his opinion upon that view of the case.
There is but one other ground assumed by appellants, which we
esteem it necessary or proper to notice in this opinion.
They "1contend that the act (of the legislature) under which the
bonds and coupons were issued is unconstitutional and void, and
all contracts entered into by the City of Maysville, or the Maysville
and Lexington Railroad Company, under and in pursuance of that
act, are also null and void."
We cannot deem it otherwise than as an imperative duty to dispose of the constitutional question thus raised, in very brief terms.
In this court, it is not now a question open for argument. It is
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one which has been formerly before the court, was thoroughly argued, maturely considered, and was solemnly and authoritatively
decided. It was not a similar question, arising in a case somewhat analogous to this; but it was identically the same question,
-the constitutionality of the very laws now brought to the consideration of the court.
In the case of Slack and others vs. the .1faysville and Lexington Railroad Company (supra), these laws were decided not to be
unconstitutional, notwithstanding the able and elaborate dissenting opinion of a distinguished member of the court. In the language of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of the
Commonwealth, by Thomas vs. Commissioners of Allegheny Co.,
7 Am. L. Reg. 92, 111, we say, "the question should beconsidered
at rest. We cannot agree with counsel, that, because it is a constitutional question, it should be treated as always open. When the
meaning of the Constitution on a doubtful question has been once
carefully considered and judicially decided, the instrument is to
be received in that sense, and every reason is in favor of a steady
adherence to the authoritative interpretation.
In the Supreme Court of iPennsylvania, when the case of Sharpless vs. the City of Philadelphia,2 Am. Law Reg. 27, 85, which
involved a constitutional question like this, was before the court,
two judges dissented from the opinion of the court, which was in
favor of the constitutionality of the law.
And yet when a similar question was presented to that court, in
the case of Commonwealth vs. Commissioners of Allegheny County,
the court felt bound by the decision in the Sharpless case.
And in this case there are even stronger reasons than any 'which
existed in that, "in favor of a steady adherence (by this court)
to the authoritative interpretation" of the constitution given in the
Slack case.
As said by Judge Lowrie, in the Allegheny bond ease, we have
before us now quite another question. In the Slack case it was
simply a question of the constitutionality of the law. Now it is a
question of the validity of contracts, in which the law is only one
of the elements."
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When the Slack case was decided, these bonds bad not been sold.
Now they are in the hands of innocent holders, who have received
them bona fide, and have parted with value to obtain them. And
without doubt we are authorized to assume that appellees and others
have bought these bonds upon the faith of that decision.
If this court were now to overrule its former decision, it would
be an inconsistency as gross in form and manifestation, as unjust
in its consequences.
Nor can we agree with counsel, that "the present holders of the
bonds are in no better condition than would be the railroad
company."
Although the bonds may not be commercial paper in the sense
of the law merchant, yet they are negotiable. And the statute
which authorized their issue makes them negotiable paper which
passes by endorsement or delivery, and is an important instrument of
commerce. Where it bears on its face evidence of genuineness,
and there is nothing to create suspicion, the person who takes it
bonafide in the course of business can enforce the payment of it,
though it be not valid as between the original parties. If on such
paper the equities are open as between the persons who created it,
its negotiability would be destroyed. And this principle applies
equally to corporations as to individuals." Opinion of Justice
McLean (of U. S. Supreme Court,) in case of Zabriskie vs. Cleveland, Columbus and Cincinnati Railroad Company, as reported
in the Cincinnati Gazette.
In that opinion Judge McLean states what we all know to be a
fact from the history of the country; that within a few years past
bonds payable to bearer, to the amount of hundreds of millions,
have been issued in this and foreign countries, to bonafide purchasers. And then concludes, "if against the holders of these
bonds technical objections can be raised, as to the mode of their
being issued, when upon their face there is nothing to excite suspicion, but everything to secure confidence, it would destroy all
reliance in such paper."
It is manifest that the judge would hear no such objections in his
court. And he describes, in very exact terms, the case of the
LMaysville bonds.
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The same doctrine is held and enunciated in full and strong
terms by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the Allegheny
bond case.
Upon this constitutional question it is only necessary further to
observe that the case of Slack vs. The Haysville and Lexington
Railroad Company does not stand alone. It was preceded and
has been followed in this court by quite a number of cases, in
which the constitutionality of such acts of the legislature as those
now under consideration has been presented to this court in divers
forms, and under different circumstances, and in every case such
laws have been decided to be constitutional. Lee Talbot vs. Dent,
9 B. Mon. 526; Withrow vs. Louisville and Nashville Railroad
Company, MS. opin. Winter term, 1855; Bardstown Railroad vs.
H'ays, ft., MS. opin. Winter term, 1858.
There has been a strong current of decisions to the same effect
in other States of the Union. The opinions of this court heretofore rendered are sustained by the decisions of Supreme and inferior Courts in nearly half of the United States. See City of Bridgeport vs. Housatonic Railroad Company, with a note containing a
list of cases in which this question has been decided. American
Railway Cases, vol. 2, pp. 39, 68.
It is the opinion of the court that there is no error in the record.
Therefore the order aforesaid, granting the writ of mandamus, is
affirmed.

